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Abstract: 
 
In the UK it has become common for commissions to be convened to recommend 
changes to the devolved settlements in Scotland and Wales. The most recent of these 
commissions was the Smith Commission, convened in September 2014 to agree a 
new package of powers for the Scottish Parliament. In this article we investigate the 
Smith Commission, offering both a first cut history of a pivotal moment in the UK’s 
constitutional development, and a case study that sheds new light on the workings of 
such commissions, on the culture and practices of civil servants, and on power 
dynamics both within Whitehall and between Whitehall and devolved governments. 
We set down a marker for what we hope will be the further comparative study of such 
commissions.  
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Introduction 
Drawing on published documents and over 24 hours of research interviews1, this 
article explores the operation and outcome of the Smith Commission, established 
shortly after Scotland’s independence referendum to determine what further powers 
would be transferred to the Scottish Parliament (Holyrood). We are interested in the 
Smith Commission both on its own terms and for what it can tell us about: (1) the 
work of devolution commissions; (2) the UK’s system of intergovernmental relations 
(IGR), and; (3) the internal dynamics of Whitehall. The article is both a first cut 
history of a significant constitutional moment and a contribution to several strands of 
existing academic literature. 
 
Devolution commissions – and commissions more broadly – have been under-
researched (exceptions include McAllister 2005a, 2005b). In part, we offer this article 
as a first step towards building up a collection of comparative insights into the UK’s 
various devolution commissions.2 Whilst each commission differs from the others, 
research might consider the themes and issues explored herein, namely: the role and 
performance of the chair; the membership and the inter-personal dynamics created; 
the mix of political figures and outside experts comprising the commission and the 
reasons for that; the role played by civil servants and the importance of their 
knowledge and previous work in structuring the process; the capacity for policy 
divergence and competitive welfare federalism created by each deal; the 
interdepartmental dynamics that revising the devolution settlement creates in 
Whitehall; and the tension between devolution’s inexorable progress and the inertia 
created by Whitehall, especially the Treasury. As commissions, which were 
politically sensitive in their day, fade further into history research interviews with the 
participants could help to build up a bank of insights about the factors that contribute 
to the success of commissions, the factors that hinder them, and the dynamics that 
persist amongst small groups often working under significant political and time 
pressures. 
 
Research on UK devolution commissions necessarily relate to IGR, the theory about 
how levels of government use formal and informal mechanisms to manage their 
relationships. IGR theory derived from formalised and uniform multi-level structures 
has been adapted to the less formal and uniform patterns found in the UK (McEwen et 
al., 2012; Bolleyer et al., 2016). Although devolution commissions do not operate 
through the formal machinery of IGR, they operate in the shadow of established 
intergovernmental relationships. Recommendations reached by such commissions 
                                               
1 A list of interviews is included as Annex A. After writing the article, and with a suitable amount of 
distance from the conclusion of the Commission’s work, we were able to talk through our arguments 
and conclusions with two of our interviewees, both closely involved in the process. These discussions 
were conducted ‘on background’ and are referenced as ‘private information’. 
2 Since 1999 two commissions – the Calman Commission (2008-2009) and the Smith Commission – 
have considered Scotland’s devolution settlement. The Richard (2002-2004), Holtham (2008-2010), 
and Silk (2011-2014) Commissions have examined Wales’ settlement. 
need to be approved by two governments – the UK government and the relevant 
devolved government – and intergovernmental working is often required following 
commissions to implement agreed policy. Of interest are not only the dynamics 
between governments, but also the dynamics within the UK government. Revising the 
devolution settlement often involves the interaction of numerous Whitehall 
departments. A close examination of such processes can shed light on inter-
department relations, and in particular the role of the Treasury both in relation to other 
Whitehall departments and the devolved governments (Deakin and Parry, 2000; 
Levitt, 2014). 
 
We first draw out key propositions from the literature that we seek to explore, outline 
our core arguments, and briefly situate the Smith Commission in the history of 
Scottish devolution. We go on to examine the assembling of the Commission and the 
structuring of the negotiations by the civil servants seconded to the secretariat. 
Following that we look at the deal reached, with a particular focus on the key areas of 
taxation and welfare, and consider the significance of the new devolved powers. We 
then shift our attention to the UK government, revealing how UK ministers exerted 
influence over the process and the tensions between Whitehall departments. Our core 
arguments are: that the deal creates new possibilities for policy divergence and what 
Keating (2012) describes as competitive welfare federalism; and that to understand 
how the deal was reached it is essential to consider not only the negotiating dynamics 
within the Commission itself, but also the power and interests of various UK 
government departments and ministers. 
 
Commissions, IGR, and Whitehall 
Commissions have become a common way of resolving, but also of controlling and 
slowing down, debates about expanding the scope of devolved powers. McAllister 
(2005a, 2005b) brought a unique perspective to her work on such commissions, 
having been member of the Richard Commission. McAllister’s articles take the reader 
through the process of a commission, from inception and the appointment of the chair, 
through to report and efforts to implement the conclusions. She draws particular 
attention to the importance of the membership and the chair, both of which are 
‘crucial components in a commission’s success … [although] their selection often 
proves controversial’. The chair is ‘clearly important, and criteria such as public 
profile, political status, relevant experience and relations with government all feature 
highly’ (2005a, pp. 499-500). Beyond the need to carry the confidence of the 
commissions’ key stakeholders, the chair has a role to play in fostering a good 
working environment amongst a small group of members. The tone that they create, 
their ability to strike a balance between authoritativeness and neutrality, and their 
ability to nudge participants towards compromise positions are often vital to the 
success of commissions.  
 
McAllister (2005b) also draws attention to the membership of such commissions, 
which, in the post-Nolan environment, have more often been advertised. The Richard 
Commission, which considered the powers and electoral arrangements of the Welsh 
Assembly during 2002-04, appointed five of its ten members through a process of 
public advertisement and competitive interview (McAllister, 2005b). Even if not 
advertised, recent examples of devolution commissions (e.g. Calman and Silk) 
featured a mix of political and non-political members, with expertise sought in 
specific areas. Composition may, in part, reflect the motive of those who established 
the commission. For example, experts might be included if the aim of the commission 
is to enhance knowledge or educate the population. On the other hand, a more 
politically oriented membership might suit commissions geared towards facilitating 
political compromise, avoiding blame (by sharing it), or increasing support for a 
proposition (see Marier, 2009). 
 
Members of a commission also require support and, as McAllister notes (2005b, 41-
2), it is common for civil servants to be temporarily seconded to secretariats 
established for such a purpose. Below we explore the role of the chair (in this case 
Lord Smith of Kelvin (Robert Smith)), the composition of the Commission, and how 
the secretariat made sense of the unusual and politically sensitive situation that they 
found themselves in. In doing so we contribute new insights that can sit alongside 
those of McAllister, building towards a deeper and comparative understanding of 
such commissions. 
 
The sparseness of the literature on commissions can be contrasted with the wealth of 
literature on IGR. This is not the place to detail the formal mechanisms of IGR that 
have been developed in the UK since devolution (see Paun and Munro, 2015, pp. 63-
80). Devolution commissions do not operate within that formal machinery but they do 
operate in the shadow of intergovernmental dynamics. The work of generating 
proposals to revise the devolution settlement might be outsourced to commissions but 
the reality is that the governments in question must agree in order for the settlement to 
have political legitimacy and be implemented successfully. It is also common for such 
commissions to arrive at broad conclusions, leaving much of the detail to be agreed in 
working groups connected to the formal IGR machinery. 
 
The fact that the Smith Commission was convened to look at Scotland’s devolution 
settlement just six months after the Silk Commission had issued its second report on 
Wales’ settlement is a reflection of a central characteristic of UK IGR: asymmetry. 
Each devolved nation has a specific settlement and that asymmetry ‘is conducive to 
bilateral and weakly institutionalised IGR’ (Swenden and McEwen, 2016, p. 489). As 
a by-product, asymmetry entrenches the power of Whitehall as the devolved nations 
have weaker incentives to present a united front (see Gallagher, 2012, pp. 208-12). 
 
Previous research has argued that IGR ‘is conducted “in the shadow of hierarchy”. In 
the context of any intergovernmental dispute, the UK government has the upper hand’ 
(Swenden and McEwen, 2016 p. 505). The reasons for this are numerous and include: 
control of UK-wide public expenditure and departmental budgets; management of the 
formal machinery of IGR; and constitutional supremacy of the UK government over 
the devolved governments. As Sweden and McEwen (2016, pp. 505-6) point out, 
these built-in advantages require qualification. A convention has arisen that the UK 
government will not act in areas of devolved policy competence without agreement, 
and UK governments face political constraints on the extent to which they can ‘flex 
their constitutional muscle against the devolved nations for fear of losing electoral 
support and legitimacy’. Despite this, the picture that emerges from studies of IGR in 
the UK is one of Whitehall dominance. We find confirming evidence of Whitehall 
dominance in our research; although not present at the Smith Commission negotiating 
table, Whitehall was able to set the political agenda and steer the process. 
 
A further issue identified within IGR, and for which we find confirming evidence, is 
the trend towards ‘more decentralisation and competitive welfare federalism’ 
(Keating, 2012, p. 227). Observing a trend across Europe towards policy 
diversification within states, Keating (2012, p. 228) suggests that ‘experimentation 
and variety may be the best way’ forward for public policy and the ongoing search for 
‘how to link labour markets, welfare, local planning, and economic development’. 
Taking issue with those who, driven by a fear – implied or explicit – of a race to the 
bottom, call for policy harmonisation, Keating embraces the shift from co-operative to 
competitive welfare federalism. In the UK context he identifies, if anything, a race to 
the top in Scotland and Wales: ‘devolution is not undermining provision or narrowing 
entitlement’ (Keating, 2012, p. 222). An environment in which policy differentiation 
is possible is the trend and, on a normative level, may well be desirable, creating the 
possibility of experimentation and policy learning. 
 
A way in which such learning may take place, via bureaucratic channels rather than 
political ones, is the unified UK civil service. This aspect of the UK state has been 
researched in the context of IGR, with civil servants being identified as a form of 
‘institutional glue’ (Parry, 2012). Civil servants in all UK administrations work to 
similar codes that lay down their responsibilities, especially political impartiality and 
a duty to serve their own ministers. Officials of the UK, Scottish and Welsh 
governments also have a common framework of pay and grading determination, and 
no barriers to transfer between administrations. This creates not a common policy 
orientation but a cultural replication of interdepartmental bargaining within the UK 
government (see Parry, 2011, 2016). 
 
This bargaining gives a special place to the central budgetary and finance agency, the 
Treasury. In common with such agencies internationally, the Treasury has a long-
standing wish for control over spending commitments and has often used targets and 
other performance management tools to exert control (Thain, 2009; Thain and Wright, 
1995). Institutionally, the Treasury often forms somewhat naïve but confidently held 
views about the human behaviours underlying benefits spending. The Department for 
Work and Pensions (DWP) is often caught in difficult relationships with the Treasury 
because its policies are about large and potentially uncontrollable entitlement 
expenditure. 
 
The Treasury has long worried about the higher level of identifiable per capita 
expenditure in the devolved nations than in England, facilitated by their political 
resources (well documented up to 1979 by Levitt, 2014; see also Mitchell, 2003, ch.8 
for tensions between the Treasury and the Scottish Education Department in the early 
part of the 20th century; and Mitchell, 2009, pp. 34-38). The 1998 devolution 
settlement removed most control on policy detail while reserving the big-ticket tax 
and welfare responsibilities. For purposes of UK economic management, devolved 
spending remained part of total managed expenditure, with the Treasury making 
assumptions about its trajectory. 
 
In the context of commission exercises like Smith, the Treasury may have to sacrifice 
the short game of increased devolved powers, which are largely determined by 
politics, in the hope that in the medium-term the ball will be back in its court via the 
overall fiscal framework and more detailed negotiation of welfare transfers. The 
model is one of tension between the inexorable trend towards further devolution and 
the Treasury’s continued taking of views on the substance of policies that might be a 
vehicle to drain the UK exchequer (Deakin and Parry, 2000, ch. 8). 
 
Core Arguments 
We offer new and confirmatory evidence regarding a number of propositions 
emerging from the above literatures. Before proceeding, the core arguments that we 
develop are:  
 
 The leadership of the Commission chair was vital, creating an effective 
working dynamic amongst the members of the Commission; 
 Civil servants from the Scottish Government and the UK government worked 
effectively, together with Holyrood officials, to construct an intelligible 
process that established and maintained momentum and reached a conclusion 
by the agreed deadline; 
 The deal reached creates the potential for policy divergence between Scotland 
and the rest of the UK, symptomatic of the shift to competitive welfare 
federalism, but those powers remain more constrained than they might appear; 
 The UK government, whilst not formally present at the negotiations, exerted 
considerable control, feeding their policy preferences into the Commission 
and shaping an outcome that fit their preferences; 
 From Whitehall, the short-term political agenda was driven by the Cabinet 
Office in service of a political agenda held by senior government ministers. 
The Treasury bowed to political realities in the short-term, confident of being 
able to reassert itself in the more technical negotiations that would follow the 
Commission’s conclusion. 
 
Devolution: A Process, Not an Event 
Following the initial devolution settlement in 1999, Holyrood assumed a range of 
devolved responsibilities including health, education, justice, and policing. Two 
significant things that were either not devolved, or only partially devolved, were 
taxation and welfare. On taxation, Holyrood was to be funded predominantly by a 
block grant from the UK government and revenue from a few small taxes. That 
situation gave rise to charges that Holyrood suffered an accountability deficit; it was 
responsible for spending money without being responsible for raising it (Mellett, 
2009). Under the 1999 arrangements Holyrood was only responsible for about 7.5% 
of total Scottish revenues (GERS, 2014, p. 26). On welfare, virtually all policies and 
powers remained reserved to Westminster in 1999. 
 
Further powers were transferred to Holyrood via the Scotland Act 2012, the product 
of the Calman Commission (2009), convened by the unionist parties at Holyrood 
largely in response to the SNP forming a minority government in 2007. The SNP did 
not participate in Calman, instead launching a parallel ‘National Conversation’ 
(Trench, 2009). The 2012 Act was designed to help close the accountability gap by 
forcing Holyrood to levy a Scottish Rate of Income Tax (SRIT). This was to be done 
by reducing the block grant to Scotland by the yield of 10 pence on income tax rates. 
The SRIT was designed in an inflexible way and did not allow the Scottish 
Government to create a more progressive income tax system (see Kenealy, 2012). 
Nevertheless, it increased the percentage of total Scottish revenue raised by Holyrood 
to around 17% (GERS, 2014, p. 26). The 2012 Act contained no substantial new 
powers in the area of welfare, part of a general tendency of the Calman Commission 
to defend the wisdom of nearly all existing policy reservations to the UK government. 
Neither the original ability to vary income tax by ±3 pence, nor the SRIT as designed 
in 2012, was designed with a view to being usable. The Treasury was comfortable 
with them as symbolic assertions of devolved fiscal responsibility. When the Smith 
Commission convened, taxation and welfare remained the two policy areas that could 
be focused on if the aim was to deliver significant new responsibilities and spending 
powers. 
 
The Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats made it clear that a ‘No’ vote 
in the referendum was a vote for further devolution. The Scottish Conservatives and 
Scottish Labour produced policy documents in 2014 committing to further 
devolution; the Liberal Democrats reiterated their commitment to federalist plans set 
out in 2012. Nine days before the referendum the three unionist parties firmly tied 
themselves to delivering further powers. Under pressure from tightening opinion polls 
the referendum was discussed at Cabinet on 2 September and two days later at the 
Quad3 (Interview 8). The Quad focused on how the risks of independence could be 
clearly and consistently communicated to Scottish voters in the closing stages of the 
referendum and how a clear signal about further powers for Holyrood could be sent. 
After a process that saw the Cabinet Secretary, Jeremy Heywood, coordinating with 
both David Cameron and former Prime Minister Gordon Brown (Interviews 8, 10), it 
was agreed that the commitment would be presented to Scottish voters as a ‘Vow’ – a 
mocked-up parchment on the front page of The Daily Record on 16 September. 
 
The ‘Vow’ committed the unionist parties to an institutional process and an 
accelerated timetable designed to underline the credibility of that commitment: a 
broad package of powers was to be set out by 30 November 2014 with a draft bill by 
25 January 2015. Until polls tightened the assumption in Whitehall was that work on 
further powers for Holyrood might be undertaken more leisurely, developing after the 
May 2015 general election (Interview 8). The timetable was adhered to with the 
Smith Commission report appearing on 27 November and the UK government 
producing a command paper detailing how Smith’s recommendations would be 
translated into law, and containing a set of draft clauses, on 22 January 2015 (UK 
Government, 2015). 
 
The Commission 
The decision to appoint Lord Smith was taken prior to the referendum and he agreed 
on the provision that his name was not leaked in advance (Interviews 8, 9, 10). 
Following the result, Cameron consulted Scotland’s then First Minister, Alex 
Salmond, to ensure that Smith, and the broader process, had his support (Interview 8). 
At the end of the referendum, ‘the climate … was one of mutual suspicion. It was 
therefore incredibly important that the P[rime] M[inister] identify the right person for 
the job – someone who was trusted and seen as a neutral, honest broker’ (Interview 
8). With an impressive resume in business and experience working in public service 
roles, Smith was an ideal candidate and in keeping with McAllister’s (2005a, pp. 499-
500) criteria. He was known and trusted by the Scottish Government from his time as 
chair of the Glasgow Commonwealth Games Organising Committee. The UK 
government was familiar with him from his chairmanship of the Green Investment 
Bank, an initiative closely associated with the Liberal Democrats. He had ‘a cache 
with Scottish elites’ (Interview 15). Lacking ‘the time or leisureliness of a Calman-
style process … Lord Smith’s name fit the bill, he had a reputation as a man who 
could deliver, the Commonwealth Games being the key example’ (Interview 10). 
Vitally, the SNP were comfortable with him: ‘we had access to him and we knew he 
was a straight shooter’ (Interview 18). 
 
                                               
3 The Quad was the most senior political committee of the coalition government comprising the Prime 
Minister David Cameron, the Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne, the Deputy Prime Minister 
Nick Clegg, and the Chief Secretary to the Treasury Danny Alexander (and briefly, before him, David 
Laws). The Quad thus consisted of two Conservatives and two Liberal Democrats. 
Before the formal negotiations began, Smith took the time to collect information on 
the key issues confronting the Commission. Both governments needed time to 
produce their analysis documents, allowing Smith to go ‘on the road. To sense check 
what the politicians might throw at him in the room’ (Interview 9). The secretariat 
organised a set of meetings between external stakeholders (e.g. third sector, business) 
and Smith, as well as a series of private technical briefings from civil servants 
(Interviews 8, 9, 16). Smith was thus able to secure an information advantage, 
learning for example that business opinion was not behind devolving corporation tax 
and that the intricacies of the UK welfare system might create problems if two 
governments were responsible for delivering it (Interview 9). Despite this, Smith was 
‘at pains not to be a player in the negotiations … He stood aside and that neutrality 
was crucial in allowing him to play the honest-broker role’ (Interview 17). 
 
Almost all interviewees remarked upon the importance of Smith’s leadership style. 
He engaged in early shuttle diplomacy between the parties to secure agreement on the 
principles underpinning the process (Interviews 2, 17). Once negotiations were 
underway he established ‘a team ethos and sense of camaraderie’ (Interview 3). He 
was prepared to be forceful when needed, reminding Commission members that they 
had a responsibility to the Scottish people, that an agreement had to be reached, and 
that he would be prepared to identify obstructionists (Interview 2). As a result of the 
atmosphere Smith cultivated, ‘nobody wanted to be thought of as the person, or 
people, who undermined the effort. He created a team and he made it clear he would 
take a dim view of anyone who didn’t play as a team’ (Interview 17). 
 
Membership of the Commission was a gift in the hands of the political party leaders. 
Each of the five political parties was asked to name two nominees; nine of the ten 
were elected politicians (see table 1). While the SNP and the Scottish Greens operate 
only in Scotland, the other three parties are Scottish components of UK-wide parties. 
The decision to have the leaders of the Scottish parties, as opposed to the UK-wide 
parties, make the appointments was to ensure that the process was seen as ‘Scottish’ 
(Interviews 8, 10). None of our interviewees hinted at any effort by UK party leaders 
to interfere with the nominating process. Whilst the Scottish Government was present 
at the table in the form of John Swinney, the Cabinet Secretary for Finance, the UK 
government was formally absent, creating an asymmetry. Despite that, the UK 
government was a crucial player in, and a determiner of, the Commission’s outcome. 
 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Notably, all five parties represented at Holyrood – including the SNP who did not 
participate in Calman – agreed to participate. Immediately following the referendum 
the SNP ‘indicated that we’d have discussions, not that we’d take part. We needed to 
understand the scope. We discussed that with Lord Smith and he told us he wanted to 
take a whole range of views into account’ (Interview 18). The SNP were realistic 
about what they could accomplish through the process but ‘political calculations 
ultimately drove us to the table. In the aftermath of the referendum we didn’t see a 
political way to explain not participating’ (Interview 17). In addition to their two 
nominees, each political party was permitted two aides. Typically, these were special 
advisers employed by the parties and were termed ‘Sherpas’. They were used to 
facilitate pre-negotiation, maintain momentum in the talks, and identify quick wins, 
allowing the majority of energy to be expended on the areas where agreement was 
most difficult to reach. 
 
The Commission was supported by a secretariat. What was unusual in this case was 
that the secretariat consisted of staff from the UK government, Scottish Government, 
and Holyrood. As the referendum approached two senior civil servants, Philip Rycroft 
– then Director-General of the Deputy Prime Minister’s office in the Cabinet Office – 
and Ken Thomson – Director-General for Constitution in the Scottish Government – 
worked together to identify appropriate staff and build a secretariat (Interview 8). The 
tripartite structure was designed, in part, to bind the Scottish Government and the 
SNP into the process, with the costs of exit growing with every step taken. The SNP 
could not find an exit strategy and that was largely a result of how the process was 
constructed (Private information). There was also an element of ‘starting as we mean 
to go on’ given that ‘any agreement would require close joint working between the 
two governments to implement it’ (Interview 8). The secretariat’s staff was identified 
based on the required range of skills, both substantive (e.g. taxation and welfare) and 
procedural (e.g. experience of managing consultations) (Interviews 10, 14, 15). 
 
In total 18 officials were seconded, organised into three teams responsible for 
‘negotiation’, ‘analysis’, and ‘outreach’. The negotiation team choreographed the 
cross-party talks and prepared the papers ahead of the Commission’s plenary 
meetings. The analysis team was responsible for commissioning briefings from the 
two governments and for organising research presentations to the Commission. The 
outreach team was responsible for handling public submissions of evidence and for 
organising a small series of public and private evidence sessions.4 Both governments 
felt the need to second their best experts to the secretariat (Interviews 9, 14) with 
those more senior also requiring ‘the political acumen to operate in this sort of 
context’ (Interview 15). 
 
Two important figures were Jenny Bates – a Treasury civil servant seconded to head 
the secretariat – and Colin Faulkner – at the time the principal private secretary to the 
Secretary of State for Scotland. Both had experience of international negotiations: 
                                               
4 The public engagement activities of the Commission were undertaken in good faith by the civil 
servants; all submissions were read and synthesised. Whilst not the focus of this paper it is important to 
note that the exercise failed to have any significant impact on the process and it was broadly criticised 
by representatives of Scottish civic life whom we interviewed. For more see Kenealy et al. (2017), pp. 
89-93. 
Bates in a G8/G20 context and Faulkner in a EU context. Both used those experiences 
to structure the process. Civil servants recognised a conscious learning from previous 
experience, employing stories and narratives that were familiar to them to help them 
make sense of the unfamiliar. Drawing on previous experiences, the Commission 
came to resemble a process of diplomacy within the state. The ‘Sherpa’ system was 
lifted directly from international negotiations. For those civil servants with experience 
of EU policymaking the political parties became akin to EU member states and Smith 
himself akin to the European Council president, using his position at the centre of the 
negotiations – and his familiarity with the positions of the parties – to bring the parties 
closer together. Square bracketing, a drafting practice common in EU negotiations, 
was used in the process to identify outstanding points of disagreement. 
 
Faulkner was tasked with structuring the process and he quickly drafted a paper 
strategising how to get to an end point through a combination of plenaries and 
bilaterals. Each plenary would discuss a specific issue and, between them, intense 
bilateral working between the members of the Commission, facilitated by the 
secretariat and Sherpas, would identify possible deals and compromises (Interview 9). 
Smith’s initial instinct was to rely more heavily on bilaterals, and less on plenaries, 
perhaps an instinct from his business experience. Once it became clear that the ten 
members got on well around the plenary table ‘we had fewer bilaterals and more 
plenaries … There was too much text in flux to handle it all through bilaterals’ 
(Interview 9). The secretariat ‘established it as an iterative process. The meetings 
were not short and the discussions were open … It was a good process internally, a 
structured framework, but there was space for discussion’ (Interview 1). Plenaries 
were intense, lasting three hours with intensive cross-examination following 45-
minute briefings from experts (Interview 2). 
 
The Sherpas played an important role in the bilateral to-and-fro around the plenaries: 
‘the secretariat-adviser link was crucial as it helped exchange and it allowed the 
Commission to really focus on the key areas. It helped the information to flow’ 
(Interview 3). The civil servants ‘wanted channels. So you had meetings of the 
Sherpas before the plenaries. As far as possible, officials would agree as much as they 
could to maximise the time available. So the big, substantive issues were left for the 
plenaries’ (Interview 17). The ‘Sherpas’ were thus a vital link between the 
Commission members and the secretariat. 
 
The importance of the civil service as the institutional glue holding together the 
devolved UK state, oft remarked upon (Parry, 2012), was proven in this case. The 
institutional glue is sociological rather than organisational (see Parry, 2016). It takes 
the form of mutual understanding of roles, and acknowledgement that interlocutors 
may have difficult positions to defend. In a devolution context, the glue was often 
held to derive from common membership of the Home Civil Service; in fact it comes 
from the maintenance of traditional minister-civil servant roles, which secure 
politicians a loyal machine (Parry, 2016). Whilst ‘there was occasional friction’ 
between the civil servants ‘there was a lot less friction than I’ve seen before between 
Whitehall departments. People pulled together and made it happen. Civil servants 
know how to work with civil servants’ (Interview 9). One civil servant observed: ‘The 
ministers might not always agree but the civil servant supporting dialogue is about as 
good as it probably can be’ (Interview 14). The process won plaudits (see Paun and 
Munro, 2015, pp. 85-6) as an example of collaborative working that ought to be 
replicated more often. 
 
The Deal 
Given that a UK general election hovered on the horizon in May 2015, and given that 
any recommendations of the Commission would have to be implemented by both 
Scottish and UK governments, it was essential that Labour, the Conservatives, the 
Liberal Democrats and the SNP supported any deal. The Conservatives, Labour and 
the Liberal Democrats all entered the Commission with pre-existing proposals for 
further devolution. In the weeks following the referendum the SNP endorsed a paper 
produced by the Scottish Government and the Scottish Greens produced a paper. 
Unsurprisingly, the SNP position was the one involving the most devolution, calling 
for maximal devolution (Scottish Government, 2014, pp. 8-10), which largely restated 
their position from a 2009 white paper (Scottish Government, 2009). The SNP were 
seeking full fiscal autonomy: that is the retention of all taxes raised in Scotland, and 
full autonomy over how that money is spent, with a remittance paid to the UK 
government for shared services such as the Bank of England, intelligence and 
diplomatic services, and the armed forces (Scottish Government 2014, pp. 11-13). As 
a model for devolution it would allow the most autonomy for Scotland to do things 
differently, including constructing an entirely different welfare system, with the 
crucial exception of pensions, which would continue to be arranged on a UK-wide 
basis. The SNP leadership were well aware that they would not secure their 
preferences but wanted to lay down a marker to pressure their negotiating partners 
into making concessions (Interviews 17, 18). 
 
Compared to the SNP the other parties’ proposals were less radical. Table 2 presents 
the main negotiating positions of the parties in the key areas of taxation and welfare.5 
Cells in table 2 are highlighted if the outcome of the Commission reflected the 
preference of the party. A glance at the table makes it clear that the outcome most 
closely reflected the preferences of the Conservative party. Both Conservative 
members of the Commission claimed to us, in interviews, that they had successfully 
‘delivered Strathclyde’ (the Conservative’s devolution proposals were the result of an 
internal party commission that was informally named the Strathclyde Commission, 
after its chair). The Conservatives – a party who opposed Scottish Home Rule through 
to the 1960s and Tony Blair’s devolution proposals in the 1990s – had managed to 
find a middle ground between the maximalist position of the SNP and Labour’s 
                                               
5  Taxation and welfare were not the only issues under negotiation but they were the issues that 
dominated and that most exercised Whitehall departments given their political economy implications. 
proposals, which blended some fairly ambitious welfare proposals with more modest 
tax proposals (Scottish Labour, 2014, pp. 11-17). The party had, as Convery and 
Lundberg (2016, p. 1) put it, linked ‘their market liberalism to a justification for 
decentralization’. Not only were the Conservatives in the middle ground of the 
proposals put forward, they possessed an intellectual argument rooted in enhancing 
the responsibility of Holyrood (Interview 2). 
 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Further devolution of income tax was seen as a way to build on Calman and, given 
that it makes up 22.6% of total non-North Sea revenues raised in Scotland (GERS, 
2016), to enhance Holyrood’s accountability. Labour’s modesty on income tax (see 
table 2) emanated from Gordon Brown’s concern that the full, or near full, devolution 
of income tax would lead to calls to bar Scottish MPs at Westminster voting on 
finance and budget bills (Interviews, 19, 20). There was a concern that this was a 
‘Tory trap’ designed to make it more difficult for future Labour Prime Ministers to 
govern. Although Brown made attempts to retake the initiative during the course of 
the Commission’s work – suggesting that Labour’s written proposals could be 
expanded upon – the party found itself in a difficult position, with its Scottish leader 
resigning abruptly on 24 October. Throughout, it remained unclear who was steering 
Labour policy, with Brown intervening from the sidelines and Ed Miliband not fully 
engaged (Interviews 19, 21). 
 
Labour, despite lobbying of Commission members by Brown (Interviews 2, 19), had 
to accommodate the income tax preferences of the Conservatives and Liberal 
Democrats because they found themselves in a minority of one. As one Commission 
member put it: ‘If Labour hadn’t budged on income tax, we’d have all hit them 
publicly’ (Interview 3). Labour managed to extract a concession on EVEL, forcing an 
insertion into the final report, asserting the right of all UK MPs to ‘continue to decide 
the UK’s budget, including income tax’ (Smith Commission, 2014, para. 75; 
Interview 19). The Conservative team negotiated language with Labour’s two 
representatives necessary to ‘keep Labour in the room behind the tax proposals’ 
(Interview 2). The language on EVEL was consistent with the McKay Commission, 
which had reported in March 2013. Labour waited until the eleventh hour to gain 
maximum leverage, and thus the best chance of securing their desired addition to the 
Smith Commission report (Interview 5). The Conservatives recognised the report 
would carry no legal weight and were content to make the deal. 
 
VAT was another significant component of the Smith settlement, with a decision 
reached to assign half of the total VAT take of Scotland to Holyrood’s budget. Whilst 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats entered the process opposed to such a move, the 
Conservatives indicated a willingness to consider some assignment to Holyrood. The 
SNP’s general preference for as much devolution as possible – and thus the 
assignment of VAT in full – combined with the Conservatives’ arguments about the 
responsibility of Holyrood formed solid support for the deal. The argument that 
devolving VAT and income tax collectively would significantly enhance the 
proportion of Scottish revenues that were the responsibility of Holyrood, feeding into 
an overarching narrative of a ‘powerhouse’ Holyrood, helped to broker the deal 
(Private information). 
 
In the area of welfare it was, once again, the SNP and the Greens who adopted the 
most maximal position, preferring to see a package of powers that would allow 
Scotland to craft its own welfare and social security policies, with the exception of 
pensions, which were never seriously considered for devolution. At the other end of 
the spectrum was the Liberal Democrats’ (2012, p. 40) federal model that would see 
‘social protection, pensions and welfare payments … allocated to the UK (and 
subsequently federal) level’. It was within the context of the UK coalition government 
– where senior Conservatives and senior Liberal Democrats could negotiate policy – 
that the Conservatives were able to persuade the Liberal Democrats to move towards 
their welfare preferences, a point to which we return below. 
 
Welfare spending in the UK can be divided into three broad categories: pension 
related spending (state pensions and pension credit); six means-tested benefits for 
people of working age that are to be rolled into a single payment, Universal Credit 
(UC)6; and other smaller benefits targeted at the elderly, the disabled, carers, etc. 
(Hood and Keiller 2016, pp. 11-13). With pensions off the table, the general principle 
with which both Labour and the Conservatives approached welfare was that of 
‘linkage’; namely, if a cash benefit was linked to a devolved policy competence then 
it should be considered for devolution (Scottish Labour, 2014, p. 11; Scottish 
Conservatives, 2014, p. 17). For example, because housing, social care and health are 
devolved responsibilities it would make sense to devolve Housing Benefit and 
Attendance Allowance.7 It was relatively easy to agree to the devolution of a series of 
fairly small – in terms of total spend – benefits8 that were not going to be rolled into 
UC. With uncertainty about how much could be done in the UC space it was 
imperative, to support the powerhouse Holyrood narrative, to ‘get some decent 
numbers around the welfare offer and so we had to go for some cash benefits that, 
together, would add up’ (Interview 8). Benefits worth almost £2.8 billion (GERS, 
2016) – a large amount but only around 17% of total welfare spending in Scotland – 
were devolved. 
                                               
6  Those six benefits are: Working Tax Credit; Child Tax Credit; Income Support; Jobseeker’s 
Allowance; Housing Benefit; and Employment and Support Allowance. 
7 Attendance Allowance is a benefit to help people pay for personal care because they are physically or 
mentally disabled and over the age of 65.  
8 Specifically, they were: Disability Living Allowance; Attendance Allowance; Winter Fuel Payments; 
Carers Allowance; Industrial Injuries Disablement Allowance; Severe Disablement Allowance; 
Discretionary Housing Payments; Sure Start Maternity Grants; and Funeral Payments. In total they 
comprise a little under £2.8 billion of expenditure in 2015-16 (GERS, 2016). 
 The ‘linkage’ argument ended up clashing with the Conservatives’ commitment to 
preserve the integrity of UC. Housing Benefit was a particular example; housing is 
devolved but the benefit was one of those to be rolled into UC. The Scottish 
Conservative (2014, p. 17) submission suggested that ‘it is likely to be 
administratively highly complex (and expensive) to disentangle the housing benefit 
element of UC for Scottish recipients … [but] if it can be done, there is a case for 
devolving housing benefit’ During the negotiations Labour staged a failed attempt to 
get other parties to back a call to extract Housing Benefit from UC (Interviews 1, 2). 
A compromise was struck that would allow Holyrood to vary the housing element 
component of UC without diluting UC overall. 
 
The bigger question was the extent to which UC could be devolved. By September 
2014, UC was behind schedule, over budget, and becoming a political liability for the 
coalition (Seldon and Snowden, 2016, pp. 295-305). UK government analysis papers 
submitted to the Commission, which the DWP had played a lead role in writing, 
suggested the possibility of significant flexibility and ‘substantial devolution of 
working-age benefits’ (UK Government, 2014, p. 72). The analysis came as a surprise 
to many involved with the Commission (Interviews 13, 16, 18). Our interviewees 
reported that, until late the negotiating process, the possibility of devolving significant 
flexibilities within UC – with Scotland being able to vary the rules, rates and tapers – 
was on the table (Interviews 2, 5, 16, 18).  
 
The Conservative members of the Commission were reigned in over the final 
weekend. A financial concern, on the part of the Treasury, about the prospect of 
devolved welfare leading to more generous entitlements and thus higher public 
expenditure combined with a concern about further challenges to the already 
struggling UC programme, on the part of the Iain Duncan Smith (then Secretary of 
State for Work and Pensions), to scotch substantial devolution. Several interviewees 
remarked that, in the closing stages of the welfare negotiations, the two Conservative 
members were left with little autonomy and were taking instruction over the 
telephone from Whitehall (Interviews 1, 16; Private information). The situation was 
the result of a fast-moving negotiation environment and the fact that the DWP’s 
political leadership were somewhat disengaged from the Commission’s work. It was 
not a conscious effort to offer something only to revoke it in the closing stages 
(Private information). 
 
The final piece of the welfare puzzle was to grant Holyrood the broad power to top-up 
any reserved benefits and to create new benefits in areas of devolved responsibility. 
The idea emanated from the Scottish Conservatives (2014, p. 16) and quickly won 
support from the SNP as a ‘better than nothing’ solution. As with the details 
surrounding the devolution of income tax, the devil remained in the detail. Whilst the 
powers were agreed in principle at the Commission negotiating table, significant work 
would be required to translate them into workable propositions after the Commission 
had concluded. 
 
The technical success of the Smith Commission – in that it reached an outcome by the 
agreed deadline – came at the expense of ambition and detail. In order to secure a 
minimum level of agreement in a short space of time, certain contentious or 
complicated issues remained unresolved. The result was a terse report with a low 
level of analysis and argument. The devolution of welfare was not sufficiently 
explored and thought through, and the discussion was ultimately cut short not only by 
the time pressures – limiting the extent of the engagement by Scotland’s academic 
and third sector – but also by Whitehall intervention. The report relied on abstract 
concepts – such as the principle of ‘no detriment’ (Smith Commission, 2014, pp. 25-
6)9 – that required subsequent intergovernmental negotiation to give it substance. 
Those negotiations are still ongoing at the time of writing. Whilst a short-term fiscal 
framework was agreed in February 2016, it will need to be revisited in the future and 
intergovernmental working continues on welfare devolution. 
 
Taken together the newly devolved powers over taxation and welfare further entrench 
the move towards competitive welfare federalism noted by Keating (2012). Also, as 
noted by Keating (2012, p. 222) ‘devolution appears to have sparked something of a 
race to the top’. Far from arguing over how to dilute social citizenship for Scots, the 
argument of the Scottish Government was that these powers would be used to craft a 
more progressive taxation system and a less punitive welfare system compared to 
those implemented and supported by the UK government. Subsequent policy 
development shows that the desire for generosity is inherent in welfare devolution but 
that expansive powers might be limited in practice and will be rolled out cautiously. 
The first enhanced benefit, an increase to Carers Allowance to the level of Jobseekers 
Allowance, is planned to start in 2018 after the establishment of a Scottish Social 
Security Agency. This is in contrast to income tax, where the UK-wide HM Revenue 
and Customs will be used. Smith brings into play full command over income tax rates 
and thresholds. The tax powers are far more usable than those associated with the 
original devolution settlement and with the 2012 Act. However, already the 
possibility of higher earners shifting their residency to avoid higher tax rates in 
Scotland – or shifting their income into savings to the same end – has demonstrated 
that the interconnected nature of the UK economy acts as a constraint on the use of 
these powers. 
 
Whitehall 
                                               
9 The Smith Commission report (2014, p. 25) suggested that the new powers should result in ‘no 
detriment as a result of the decision to devolve further power: the Scottish and UK Governments’ 
budgets should be no larger or smaller simply as a result of the initial transfer of tax and/or spending 
powers’. It went on (p. 26) to call for ‘no detriment as a result of UK Government or Scottish 
Government policy decisions post-devolution’. The report thus suggested a complex reimbursement 
mechanism for decisions of either government, the details of which required significant negotiation. 
As negotiations progressed, the UK government and Whitehall made their presence 
felt in numerous ways. Our findings are interesting for what they reveal about the 
communication links between the Conservative and Liberal Democrat members of the 
Commission and senior government ministers in the Quad, and for what they reveal 
about interdepartmental dynamics within Whitehall, specifically between the Cabinet 
Office and the Treasury. Though informal, the Quad was where the coalition set 
political strategy, often proving vital to the governing process, allowing the most 
senior ministers to reconcile party differences, especially on issues related to taxation 
and public expenditure (Seldon and Snowdon, 2016, pp. 38-40, 239-41). Further 
devolution to Scotland had implications in this space but it was the political 
sensitivity of the Commission that put it on the Quad’s agenda (Interview 8). The 
Quad had met before the Commission convened to agree that the Liberal Democrats 
were happy to move in the direction of the Conservative proposals, particularly on 
welfare. Liberal Democrat ministers recognised that the political situation had 
progressed in such a way that a significant offer on both taxation and welfare would 
be necessary. The Quad also discussed Commission developments on at least two 
occasions, to approve the developments at the highest political level, and to check the 
process was running to time (Private information). 
 
At a day-to-day level, monitoring and oversight of the Commission was in the hands 
of Danny Alexander and Andrew Dunlop (Interviews 8, 10). Alexander, although not 
the Secretary of State for Scotland, was the key Scottish political adviser to Nick 
Clegg, the Liberal Democrat Deputy Prime Minister (Seldon and Snowdon, 2016, p. 
129). The key to understanding Alexander’s role vis-à-vis Smith has less to do with 
his ministerial position and more to do with the confidence in which Clegg held him, 
allowing him to exercise authority over Michael Moore and Tavish Scott. Dunlop was 
a special adviser on Scotland to Cameron and maintained close links to the Prime 
Minister, the Chancellor, and the Conservative’s Smith Commission team throughout 
(Interview 8). The third person who was vital day-to-day was Philip Rycroft, a senior 
Cabinet Office official, who was serving as Director-General of the Deputy Prime 
Minister’s Office (DPMO). Rycroft made sense, not only given his familiarity with 
devolution (he had held positions in the Scottish Government), but also because the 
DPMO had held responsibility for constitutional reform since 2010 (Hazell and Yong, 
2012, p. 157). Rycroft led the establishment of the tripartite secretariat (working with 
Ken Thomson in the Scottish Government and Paul Grice in at Holyrood), identified 
Jenny Bates for the lead role, and was her line manager throughout the process 
(Private information). As one civil servant put it, ‘nothing was done independently 
without Danny, Number 10 [Dunlop] and Phil Rycroft on board’ (Interview 10). 
 
On assuming responsibility for the process, Rycroft confirmed with the Treasury’s 
two most senior civil servants that the Cabinet Office would provide the policy lead 
(Private information). That this role did not go to the Treasury followed the precedent 
of devolution planning in the 1970s and 1990s; the issue was in the last resort 
constitutional rather than financial. Within the Quad, Osborne and Alexander sought 
neither to defend nor advance the departmental view of the Treasury vis-à-vis 
devolution in terms of avoiding tax competition or new powers with significant public 
expenditure implications (Private information; Interview 8). Osborne’s and 
Alexander’s roles in the Quad were not ministerial but rather political. Interestingly, 
several of our non-Whitehall interviewees described the process as ‘Treasury 
dominated’ (Interviews 16, 18) but those closest to the process at Whitehall presented 
a different narrative. 
 
The inexorable logic of devolution mandated that further powers were devolved in the 
areas of taxation and welfare. It was hard to imagine a way of creating a powerhouse 
Holyrood that did not involve devolving both spending power and tax power. 
Although the Treasury was uncomfortable with the possibility of tax competition 
within the UK and with the public expenditure implications of devolving welfare 
powers, there was little that the institution could do in the face of a political 
momentum that was endorsed at the highest level by the Quad (Interview 12; Private 
information). The Treasury thus ceded short-term control over the negotiations to the 
Cabinet Office but, playing a longer game, knew that some form of control would 
return to them when the Smith Commission’s broad recommendations had to be 
transformed into workable policies and mechanisms. That process required the 
negotiation of a fiscal framework between Scotland and the UK government, to 
determine how Scotland’s block grant would be adjusted to account for the new tax 
powers, and the creation of new IGR machinery in the area of welfare and social 
security. Treasury officials looked forward to that point, where they would be able to 
retake some control over the process, ‘to shape the implementation of policy … The 
devil will be in the details and that’s when the Treasury’s analysis will play a role’ 
(Interview 12; Private information). 
 
Insofar as the Treasury had a role in the negotiations it was in sounding notes of 
caution about the complexity of the task ahead and in shaping the input of the delivery 
departments and agencies such as HMRC and the DWP (Interview 11). The Treasury 
was ‘controlling … the broad flow of paper, and so on, but they were not controlling 
the process’ (Interview 8). The Treasury has been managing devolved fiscal relations 
since 1999 through its Nations and Regions Team and has a keen sense of the 
interconnections between parts of the picture that might be less present in other 
departments (DWP officials had to learn quickly, for example, as the department had 
engaged less than many others with devolution given the lack of significant welfare 
devolution to Scotland and Wales). Treasury expertise remained a valuable 
commodity in this process. But, our evidence reveals that policy decisions that have 
significant implications for public expenditure and taxation can be placed beyond 
Treasury control if they are politically charged enough, despite the wealth of evidence 
showing how the Treasury exerts control over other Whitehall departments (Thain, 
2009; Thain and Wright, 1995; Deakin and Parry, 2000). 
 
Conclusion 
The Smith Commission was a political fix in the guise of an investigation. Its pre-
determined task, which it accomplished, was to put together a package of powers that 
could be presented as delivering a ‘powerhouse’ Holyrood. This neutralised the heat 
of the referendum battle by creating some legitimacy and consensus around the next 
stage of Scotland’s devolution journey. Its report was a checklist of agreed points and 
mentions of unresolved issues. The contrast with Calman is clear: that too was a 
response to political events – the proposals of the SNP government after they came to 
power in 2007 – but it took more time, engaged in more research, and had a more 
diverse membership. In the comparative contexts offered by Hunter and Boswell 
(2015) and Maurier (2009), the Smith process provides important UK-based evidence 
of the way that commissions can provide urgent propulsion to policy rather than a 
reflective consideration of it. We offer this research as a first step in the process of 
building a comparative understanding of such commissions, as well as a first cut 
history of an important point in the development of devolution.  
Annex: List of Interviews 
1. Smith Commission member 1 
2. Smith Commission member 2 
3. Smith Commission member 3 
4. Smith Commission member 4 
5. Smith Commission member 5 
6. Smith Commission member 6 
7. Smith Commission member 7 
8. Senior civil servant, UK Government 1 
9. Senior civil servant, UK Government 2 
10. Senior civil servant, UK Government 3 
11. Senior civil servant, UK Government 4 
12. Senior civil servant, UK Government 5 
13. Senior civil servant, UK Government 6 
14. Senior civil servant, Scottish Government 1 
15. Senior civil servant, Scottish Government 2 
16. Senior civil servant, Scottish Government 3 
17. SNP official 1 
18. SNP official 2  
19. Scottish Labour official 
20. Scottish Labour MSP 1  
21. Scottish Labour MSP 2 
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Table 1. Smith Commission members 
 
Party Nominee Rationale 
Conservatives Annabel Goldie MSP; former leader with credibility/seniority; 
spokesperson on constitutional issues. 
 
Adam Tomkins Constitutional lawyer at Glasgow University; senior 
adviser to party on devolution issues; technical 
expertise; gender balance. 
Scottish Greens Maggie Chapman Local councillor; credibility/seniority as party co-
convener. 
 
Patrick Harvie MSP; credibility/seniority as party co-convener; gender 
balance. 
 
Labour Iain Gray MSP; former leader with credibility/seniority. 
 
 
Gregg McClymont MP; spokesperson on pensions; Westminster/Holyrood 
balance. 
 
Liberal Democrats Michael Moore MP; former Secretary of State for Scotland with 
knowledge of devolution; close to Nick Clegg and 
Danny Alexander. 
Tavish Scott MSP; former leader with seniority/credibility; 
spokesperson on relevant issues; 
Westminster/Holyrood balance. 
SNP Linda Fabiani MSP; backbencher with links to party’s left; devolution 
knowledge from chairing Holyrood committee on 2012 
Scotland Act. 
John Swinney MSP; senior government minister with knowledge of 
devolution; party seniority; gender balance. 
 
Source: Interviews 1-7, 17-21. 
 
  
 Table 2. The Smith Commission: Preferences and Outcomes. 
 
 
 Conservatives SNP Labour Lib Dems 
 
Outcome 
T
a
x
a
ti
o
n
 
Income tax Devolve control over rates 
and bands of personal 
income tax; reserve 
control over income tax 
on investments, dividends 
and savings, the personal 
allowance, and definition 
of income. 
Devolve in full. Widen variation of 
personal income tax from 
10p (Scotland Act 2012) 
to 15p; introduce new 
progressive income tax 
rates so Holyrood can 
increase rates but not 
decrease higher/additional 
bands. 
 
Devolve control over 
personal income tax; 
reserve income tax on 
investments, dividends 
and savings but assign 
proportion of receipts to 
Scot budget. 
Devolve control over rates 
and bands of personal 
income tax; reserve 
control over income tax 
on investments, dividends 
and savings, the personal 
allowance, the definition 
of income, and tax reliefs.  
VAT Given EU law, examine 
case for assigning share of 
revenues to Scot budget. 
Given EU law, VAT in 
Scotland to be set at UK 
level with revenues 
assigned to Scot budget. 
 
Reserve. Reserve. Receipts from the first 
10% of standard VAT 
assigned to Scot budget. 
Air Passenger Duty Devolve. Devolve. Further consideration of 
environmental impact and 
potential tax competition 
before devolving. 
 
Devolve. Devolve. 
Aggregates Levy N/r Examine best way 
forward given EU dispute. 
N/r Devolve subject to 
outcome of EU dispute. 
 
Devolve once legal issues 
with EU clarified. 
National Insurance Reserve. Devolve. Reserve. Reserve. 
 
Reserve. 
Inheritance Tax Reserve. Devolve. Reserve. Devolve. 
 
Reserve. 
Capital Gains Reserve. Devolve. Reserve. Devolve. 
 
Reserve. 
 Corporation Tax Reserve. Devolve. Reserve. Reserve but assign 
revenue to Scot budget. 
 
Reserve. 
Fuel duties Reserve. Devolve. Reserve. N/r Reserve. 
 
Excise duties Reserve. Set at UK level but assign 
revenues raised to Scot 
budget. 
 
Reserve. Reserve. Reserve. 
W
el
fa
re
 
Universal Credit 
(UC) 
Integrity of UC to be 
preserved across the UK; 
flexibilities to be explored 
to allow policy 
differentiation. 
Halt rollout in Scotland so 
as not to compromise 
practical ability to 
devolve individual 
benefits. 
N/r 
Social protection and 
welfare should be a UK 
responsibility; strategic 
planning of welfare 
services could be 
considered for joint 
working between UK and 
devolved governments. 
Reserved but devolved 
powers to alter frequency 
and nature of payments; 
devolved power to vary 
housing cost elements. 
  
Attendance 
Allowance 
 
Consider devolving. Devolve. Devolve. Devolve. 
Housing Benefit Devolve if flexibility can 
be found within UC.  
 
Devolve. Devolve. Power to vary housing 
costs within UC devolved. 
Supplementing UK 
benefits 
Examine case for 
Holyrood supplementing 
UK benefits. 
 
Not relevant, party seeks 
near full devolution of 
welfare. 
N/r Devolved power to create 
new benefits in areas of 
devolved responsibility 
and to supplement UK 
benefits. 
 
Job Centre Plus 
and Work 
Programme 
N/r Fully devolved. Work Programme 
delivery devolved to local 
government with 
Holyrood providing 
strategic oversight. 
 
Scottish Government to 
act as Whitehall’s agent in 
this policy space. 
Job Centre Plus reserved; 
employment support 
programmes devolved 
once existing commercial 
contracts expire. 
N/r = not explicitly referenced in document submitted to Smith Commission. 
 Note: the Scottish Greens submitted a document to the Smith Commission setting out broad principles but typically not making specific commitments. On taxation and 
welfare they were broadly of the view that the default position should be to devolve powers, unless a compelling case could be made to reserve them to the UK government. 
They have been omitted from the table to allow a clearer presentation. 
Note: The Commission agreed to devolve a set of benefits outwith UC (see endnote 7) but party submissions typically did not deal explicitly with them, hence they are 
excluded from the table. 
Source: Scottish Conservatives (2014); Scottish Labour (2014); Scottish Liberal Democrats (2012); Scottish Government (2014); Scottish Greens (2014). 
 
 
